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Abstract 
      Recently, there are many considerations of what will be the future of liberal world order after the end of unilateral hegemony 
of the United States resulted in the decreasing of its role and increasing of the role and importance of non-liberal powers; whether the 
current world order based on Western values will sustain or finally become a part of history in the so-called post-American era.  The 
present article is intended to demonstrate how liberal world order will keep functioning on the world arena regardless of toughening 
non-liberal forces by pleading its ability to accommodate the interests of the rising forces. The present article also discusses the US 
role in preserving and steady developing of liberal world order in the future. 
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Recently, there are many considerations of what will be 
the future of the liberal world order after the end of unilateral 
hegemony of the United States which resulted in the decreasing 
of its role and increasing of the role and importance of non-
liberal powers; whether the current world order based on West-
ern values will sustain or finally become a part of history in 
the so-called post-American era. It should be noted that despite 
the skeptical views about its future, major virtue of the liberal 
world order lies in its flexibility to accommodate the interests 
of newly emerged powers on the international arena. 
First, it should be mentioned that post WW2 liberal world 
order is not merely the US hegemonic order. It represents a 
rule-based, open system creating the mechanisms for stability 
and peaceful coexistence of the states in the face of anarchy. 
Liberal world order not only provides the regulatory means 
for economic relations, which virtually conditioned the steady 
development of present rising powers by enabling all players 
to get involved in the rule-based international economic rela-
tions, but also the mechanisms for collective security, dispute 
settlement, conflict resolution and collective action. Thus, the 
present world order offers the countries a set of game rules and 
mechanisms, the commitment of which is    in everyone’s in-
terest, as they can create the conditions for stable international 
relations by reducing negative effects of international anarchy.
American scholar, John Ikenberry1 names three particular 
features of the Western order that have been critical to its suc-
cess and longevity. First, unlike the imperial systems of the 
past, the Western order is built around rules and norms of non-
discrimination and market openness, creating conditions for 
rising states to advance their expanding economic and political 
goals within it. Second is the coalition-based character of its 
leadership unlike the past orders that have tended to be domi-
nated by one state. The leading states of the current Western 
order, most of them advanced liberal democracies, do not al-
ways agree, but they are engaged in a continuous process of 
give-and-take over economics, politics, and security. Power 
transitions are typically seen as being played out between two 
countries, a rising state and a declining hegemon, and the order 
falls as soon as the power balance shifts. But in the current or-
der, the larger aggregation of democratic capitalist states - and 
the resulting accumulation of geopolitical power - shifts the 
balance in the order’s favor. Third, the postwar Western order 
has an unusually dense, encompassing, and broadly endorsed 
system of rules and institutions. It is more open and rule-based 
than any previous order. The overall system is dense with mul-
tilateral rules and institutions - global and regional, economic, 
political, and security related. They have laid the basis for un-
precedented levels of cooperation and shared authority over the 
global system. (Ikenberry John, 2008)
The key factor in stability and viability of Western world 
order in post-American epoch lies in its flexibility and ability 
to accommodate new actors. In fact, the so-called rising powers 
managed to reinforce inside this system and as a result of using 
wisely its institutes, so their future prosperity and development 
depend on the involvement in this system. Despite the exist-
ence of conflict of interests between the US and the rising pow-
ers in a number of areas, it is important to acknowledge that 
none of these states will try to overthrow the open, rule-based 
liberal world order. This is natural, as the existing system has 
created favorable conditions for their development. They will 
only fight for the expansion of their rights within this system 
through increasing of their participation in international institu-
tions (and therefore, increasing their participation in the deci-
sion-making process). If we, for example, look at China, which 
as many believe is the main competitor of the United States in 
the 21st century, we will see that its development totally de-
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pends on the existence of the open, liberal system. China, more 
than any other states needs an open world, where it will buy 
raw materials and export its production later. The existence of 
stable, rule-based and open world order is vitally important for 
China’s development.
Another source of flexibility of present world order is its 
nature to enable strong states to become not only a part of the 
system but decision-makers as well. Emergence of new strong 
states on the international arena casts a growing importance 
over the G-20 format uniting all global powers of the current 
world. As for China, whose impressive progress is perceived as 
a major threat to maintaining liberal world order, is a member 
of UN Security Council – the central institute of the very or-
der, leading Ikenberry to believe that it gives China the same 
authority and advantages of “great-power exceptionalism” as 
the other permanent members…. As China sheds its status as 
a developing country (and therefore as a client of these institu-
tions), it will increasingly be able to act as a patron and stake-
holder instead. (Ikenberry, 2008) The thing is, that the more 
powerful the states get, the more advantages they are given by 
the system in terms of increasing their bargaining power in im-
portant decision-making process, making them stakeholders of 
the system. 
The above-mentioned depreciates the threat posed by non-
liberal and non-Western China, as some believe, against liberal 
world order. On the contrary, as noted earlier, Chinese develop-
ment was achieved through the game rules and mechanisms of 
the present order and its future heavily depends on them as well. 
Thus, the end of American hegemony as the founder of this 
liberal order does not mean the end of the system itself. A rela-
tively real threat against liberal order by China is not much its 
overturn but a formation of satellite mini-orders within the very 
system which may leave the West outside the game (Naazneen 
Barma, 2008). However,  such a course of things  implies an 
unrealistic assumption that relations with the West will become 
uninteresting for China and for other growing countries, many 
of which will transfer in a mini-order created by China. The 
thing is that the West does not mean only the United States. 
China may outpace economically the United States in the near 
future but the Chinese achievements still seem less impressive 
compared to that of  the West as a whole including European 
states together with the US. China’s influence will fade further 
if compared to Western military strength. Moreover, as a result 
of introduction of  the the alternative (however, also liberal) 
mini-order by China, the existing universal world order, as 
Ikneberry maintains, could give way to a more contested and 
fragmented system of blocs, spheres of influence, mercantilist 
networks, and regional rivalries. It would be less open and rule-
based, and it would be dominated by an array of state-to-state 
ties. But on a global scale, such a system would not advance the 
interests of any of the major states, including China (Ikenberry 
John , 2011). The scale of possibilities provided by such a di-
vided system would not match the one provided by the existing 
liberal order to its members serving as an additional example of 
why rising powers would refuse to join China’s limited system 
excluding the West, making even China itself go back to the 
old game rules. 
Dissolution of liberal world order into mini orders is heav-
ily dependent on the stimuli of newly emerging rising powers 
caring for their interests. In the international relations theory it 
is known that the process of hegemony decreasing and new state 
enhancing is characterised with the transitional period turmoil: 
“Rising states want to translate their newly acquired power into 
greater authority in the global system--to reshape the rules and 
institutions in accordance with their own interests. Declining 
states, in turn, fear their loss of control and worry about the 
security implications of their weakened position.” (Ikenberry 
John, 2008) The future of liberal world order also rests on the 
actions of today’s strongest state. As mentioned above, the ris-
ing powers will not attempt to topple the existing liberal order 
but they will only fight for the expansion of their rights within 
this system through increasing of their participation in interna-
tional institutions, and therefore, increasing their participation 
in the decision-making process in order to gain more authority 
within the system. The rising forces often criticize the mod-
ern world order’s institutions (mostly it refers to the UN Se-
curity Council) for absence of representativeness that would 
reflect the current distribution of power in the world. Thus, if 
the United States will compromise some of its present power 
for the sake of harmonious functioning of liberal order and let 
other states get more involved in world affairs, the latter are set 
to pose less destabilization risks. 
America’s care for preserving liberal order means caring 
for its place and role within the system as well. If the United 
States will try not to give in privileged positions  in favor of 
new players in the system, both the liberal order and ameri-
can role and influence in international relations are bound to 
be seriously jeopardized. However, if the United States follows 
the natural flows in international relations, which lead to the 
reconstruction of existing international institutions and acts not 
as a dominant but as primus inter pares, it will be able to ensure 
the maintenance of liberal world order by its transformation in 
such a way that the interests of rising states will be taken into 
account. Reinforcing and strengthening the institutions of cur-
rent world order will simultaneously allow the United States to 
maintain its leadership position.
Thus, if the United States wants to maintain its leadership 
in the frames that the current world order allows, it has to sub-
ordinate to the new requirements of the order that it once cre-
ated. US leadership in post-hegemonic era should be expressed 
in forming the agenda of international relations and that is the 
role that the US will have to play for quite a long time. Through 
the observations of the latest developments in the world (e.g. 
the Arab Spring), it became obvious that the so called rising 
powers are not ready to take responsibility for the events that 
take place outside their borders unless their vital interests are 
endangered. This reality is not supposed to change in the com-
ing decade as well. Therefore, the world needs flexible lead-
ership from the United States that should be expressed in the 
formation of agenda and subsequently, in convincing the major 
players to cooperate in its implementation. 
In the given circumstances, the most important challenge 
for the United States in the 21st century will be the reforming 
of the liberal institutionalism, as a form of the world order, on 
the bases of the natural flows towards its evolution. In this way 
America will, for the third time in its existence, continue to 
lead in the formation of an international order that will be an 
open, rule-based, evolutional form of the liberal institutional-
ism, where the newly emerging powers will manage to pursue 
their vital interests and this fact, together with American lead-
ership will be the guarantor for the stability of the new inter-
national order.
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Conclusion
As a conclusion it can be said that threats that non-liberal 
forces will harm the liberal world order after the end of Ameri-
can hegemony are exaggerated. First of all, the existing order 
is and has never been just under american hegemony - instead 
it represents an open, rule-based system that can advance the 
interests of each participant, and the one that offers the states a 
set of game rules and mechanisms serving their best interests, 
as it can reduce the negative effects of anarchy and provide 
peaceful cohabitation of states on the international arena. Ris-
ing powers should not be oriented on fighting against liberal 
world order since their consolidation took place within the very 
system through applying its instruments and unimpeded func-
tioning of this system is vitally depended on their future pro-
gress. The rising powers are set to merely extend the scope of 
their involvement in decision-making process within the sys-
tem, so their major claim to the existing system is and will be 
its reconstruction in a way to recognize and reflect the current 
distribution of power in the world. 
For the future stability of liberal world order actions of the 
United States are important as well. As mentioned above, if 
the United States will try not to give in privileged positions  in 
favor of new players in the system, both the liberal order and 
american role and influence in international relations are bound 
to be seriously jeopardized. However, if the United States fol-
lows the natural flows in international relations, which lead to 
the reconstruction of existing international institutions and acts 
not as a dominant but as primus inter pares, it will be able to 
ensure the maintenance of liberal institutionalism by its trans-
formation in such a way that the interests of rising states will 
be taken into account. In this way America will, for the third 
time in its existence, continue to lead in the formation of an 
international order that will be an open, rule-based, evolutional 
form of the liberal institutionalism, where the newly emerging 
powers will manage to pursue their vital interests and this fact, 
together with American leadership will be the guarantor for the 
stability of the new international order.
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